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Chapter I. Introduction 
In November 2018, Russian coast guard vessels fired upon and apprehended three Ukrainian 
naval vessels near the coast of Crimea.1 In relation to the incident, Ukraine brought the case 
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),2 accusing Russia of unlawful 
seizure and detention of the Ukrainian vessels and servicemen on board3 and requesting the 
Tribunal prescribe provisional measures for the release of the vessels and the crew and their 
return to Ukraine.4  
Upon ratification of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC),5 Russia has made 
a declaration in accordance with art. 298(1)(b) of the Convention.6 According to this article, 
State-parties to the Convention are allowed to exclude from the compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism all disputes concerning military activities and those disputes regarding law 
enforcement activities that involve marine scientific research or the sovereign rights of coastal 
States over fisheries in their exclusive economic zone. Considering that all military activities 
and only some law enforcement activities can be excluded from the compulsory dispute 
settlement, the clear-cut distinction between the two becomes all the more important.  
The ITLOS confirmed prima facie that the actions of the Russian Federation can qualify as a 
law enforcement activity. 7  The ITLOS, therefore, issued an order on the prescription of 
provisional measures demanding the immediate release of the Ukrainian vessels and the crew. 
 
1 The factual background of the incident is discussed in chapter II.  
2 Case Concerning the Detention of three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation) 
Provisional measures, Order [2019] ITLOS Case No. 26, ICGJ 542. 
3 Case Concerning the Detention of three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation) 
Provisional measures [2019] ITLOS Case No. 26. Request of Ukraine for the Prescription of Provisional 
Measures under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
para.2. 
4 Ibid, para.46. 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3. 
6 Federal law of the Russian Federation No. 30-ФЗ “On the ratification of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea” (26 February 1997) (Official text is available in Russian: 
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102045863).  
7 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Provisional measures n.2, paras.74-76.  
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The case is also pending the decision of the LOSC Annex VII arbitral tribunal, administered by 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 8  which will be tasked with re-assessing its 
jurisdiction and potentially deciding on the merits of the case, which may involve such issues 
as the legality of Russia’s actions, the passage regime in and near the Kerch Strait, as well as 
the immunity and innocent passage of warships. 
 
1.1 Objective 
The thesis engages in the critical analysis of the conclusion of the ITLOS on prima facie 
jurisdiction and its evaluation of the Russia-Ukraine incident. The thesis further discusses the 
future PCA’s decision on jurisdiction, which may differ from the assessment of the ITLOS. The 
objective of the thesis is to analyse and address some of the uncertainties with regard to defining 
a situation as a military or law enforcement activity. For that purpose, the author seeks to 
systematize and examine the criteria necessary for distinguishing between the two types of 
activities and review different arguments for the evaluation of the incident.  
Within the thesis, the distinction between law enforcement and military activities is drawn for 
the purpose of dispute resolution. Therefore, the research also seeks to contribute to the 
discussion on possible weaknesses or uncertainties surrounding the current dispute resolution 
mechanism of Part XV of the LOSC, especially with regard to the optional exception from the 
compulsory dispute settlement concerning military and law enforcement activities. From this 
perspective, more clarity in the definitions and limits of the exceptions from the compulsory 
dispute settlement could positively impact the consistency and predictability of the dispute 
settlement mechanism. This could, in turn, make States more willing to bring disputes before 
an international court or tribunal, which helps further interpret and develop the international 
law. 
The thesis will further attempt to reach its own conclusion on whether the 2018 Russian-
Ukrainian incident near the Kerch Strait qualifies as law enforcement or military activity and 
open the discussion on the difference between law enforcement and military activities as 
applicable to other incidents worldwide, including, among others, the frequent low-level 
 
8 Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen (Ukraine v. the Russian 
Federation) Award pending [2019] PCA Case No. 2019-28. 
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confrontations between the Greek and Turkish coast guard vessels in the Aegean Sea9 and the 
incidents of harassment of the US naval vessels in the Chinese maritime zones.10 Apart from 
the undeniable relevance of this topic for the current, still unresolved, Ukrainian-Russian 
dispute regarding the arrest of Ukrainian naval vessels, the issues discussed in the thesis are 
also of importance for the ongoing PCA case on the rights of both States in the Black Sea, Azov 
Sea and Kerch Strait,11 as well as in a broader context of security operations elsewhere in the 
world. 
Although the main focus of the thesis lies in the domain of the law of the sea, the research will 
also inadvertently engage in discussions on the applicability of humanitarian law to the present 
case study. Quasi-military activity at sea can be considered a tool used by States to avoid 
responsibilities that arise from the involvement in a full-fledged armed conflict. States may also 
use this tool to avoid the LOSC compulsory dispute settlement based on the military activities 
exception. The clarity in the distinction between military and law enforcement activities and 
the scopes of application of the law of the sea and humanitarian law may help prevent States 
from exploiting this grey area of law and contribute to the goal of peaceful and equitable use of 
the sea.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The main research question for the thesis is formulated as follows: How does international law 
distinguish between military and law enforcement activities at sea for the purpose of dispute 
resolution within the case study of the 2018 incident between Russia and Ukraine near the 
Kerch Strait? 
 
9 M Pappa, “The Aegean Sea dispute on the edge of escalating. Mapping the legal options between 
Greece and Turkey” (2020) Völkerrechtsblog. 
10  P Nguyen “Deciphering the Shift in America's South China Sea Policy” (2016) Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 38(3), pp.389–421, p.392-393. 
11 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v 
Russian Federation) Award concerning the preliminary objection of the Russian Federation [2020] PCA 
Case No. 2017-06. 
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The main question will require the addressing of the following sub-questions in the context of 
the present case study:  
• What criteria have been outlined so far for distinguishing between law enforcement and 
military activities? 
• What kind of disputes “concern” military activities?  
• What role does the type of vessels involved in an incident play in the identification of 
the incident as law enforcement or military activity?  
• How do conduct, cause, purpose and context of an incident help separate law 
enforcement activities from military activities?  
 
1.3 Methodology and sources 
The research questions require the application of the legal doctrinal methodology. This 
approach will help analyse and interpret the appropriate legal sources, as defined in art. 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice12 (ICJ), which include international treaties, 
customary international law, general principles, jurisprudence, and legal publications of 
scholars. The thesis also follows the outlined case study of the 2018 incident near the Kerch 
Strait and applies the legal sources as far as relevant for this incident.  
The thesis adopts the rules outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
for the interpretation of treaties.13 However, the present study also requires reliance on the 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, such as judicial decisions and teachings 
of highly qualified scholars. Although the judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals 
have “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case,”14 the 
courts, nevertheless, strive for consistency, coherence, and predictability of the case law. This 
is especially important when it comes to vague and ambiguous provisions. In this way, 
jurisprudence can help bring clarity to disputed legal norms and identify their proper 
interpretation. Often using case law as a starting point, the thesis compares and contrasts 
arguments unveiled by various previous judicial decisions, assessing their consistency and 
 
12 Statute of the International Court of Justice (24 October 1945) 33 UNTS 933.  
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331.  
14 ICJ Statute, n.12, art.59. 
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discussing them in a critical manner. Likewise, the thesis utilizes the writings of scholars, which 
help uncover arguments behind the meaning of legal provisions, support academic debates and 
discuss the law and facts without the jurisdictional restrains. The use of non-legal sources, such 
as news articles, is primarily limited to chapter II for establishing the factual background of the 
incident.  
More specifically, the present thesis will use as its sources multilateral treaties in the area of 
the law of the sea, mainly the LOSC and Russian-Ukrainian bilateral agreements. Limited use 
of treaties on humanitarian law is expected, as well as the non-binding San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.15  
The thesis also analyses and critically assesses the 2019 Order of the ITLOS on the prescription 
of provisional measures, the 2020 PCA Award on preliminary objections of the case concerning 
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, as well as other documents 
related to these two cases in parts relevant for the identification and distinction between law 
enforcement and military activities. Other case law that includes discussions on military and 
law enforcement activities or assessment of other exceptions from the compulsory dispute 
settlement mechanism is also actively engaged with for the purpose of interpreting the legal 
provisions. Articles and other works of scholars that discuss the present topic are analysed to 
further interpret the legal provisions and identify diverging opinions. 
The existing literature provides ample information on various general issues surrounding the 
theme of maritime security. Such renowned authors, as Natalie Klein or James Kraska, wrote 
extensively on the issues of both law enforcement and military activities and their books and 
publications provide an excellent foundation for the topic of this thesis. At the same time, there 
has not been found many examples of authors engaging in the discussion on how to distinguish 
between the use of force in the context of law enforcement and military activities. Nevertheless, 
their findings will be helpful for identifying the key elements of both types of activities and will 
help draw a distinction between them.  
 
15 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (12 June 1994) ICRC 
IHL database. Mode of access: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/560 [last accessed 4 June 
2021].  
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Books and articles related to the status of waters between Russian and Ukrainian coasts and 
Russian-Ukrainian disagreements in the law of the sea issues are present in the literature, 
especially in works of Ukrainian and Russian authors. Of note here is the book on international 
law in relationships between Ukraine and Russia of professor Zadorozhnii,16 as well as various 
articles of Russian scholars, such as Judge Kolodkin, as well as Sulakshyn, Gutsulyak and 
Surzhyn.  
More specifically, the Ukraine-Russia incident near the Kerch Strait has also received 
international attention in recent publications of James Kraska,17 Yurika Iishi,18 Xinxiang Shi 
and Yen-Chiang Chang,19 Valentin J. Schatz and Dmytro Koval.20 The mentioned articles 
commented on certain aspects of the case or evaluated the definition of military activities. 
However, they did not enter into extensive discussions on the objective criteria necessary to 
distinguish between law enforcement and military activity. Yushifumi Tanaka has both 
commented on the 2018 incident and raised the question of the criteria for evaluating the nature 
of activities as part of military or law enforcement.21 Even though the main purpose of his 
article was a comparative analysis between two cases involving the release of a detained vessel 
through provisional measures, his findings bear strong relevance for the present research. Apart 
from this, the incident has been commented upon by Russian and Ukrainian representatives in 
the ITLOS provisional measures case and the ongoing case at the PCA. Although the final 
award in the case will not be available by the time the thesis is finished, the submissions of 
States, the Order of ITLOS (together with declarations, separate and dissenting opinions of 
 
16 ОВ Задорожній, Міжнародне право в міждержавних відносинах України і Російської Федерації 
1991-2014 (Київ: К.І.С. 2014). 
17 J Kraska, “Did ITLOS Just Kill the Military Activities Exception in Article 298?” (2019) European 
Journal of International Law 30(3).  
18  Y Ishii, “The Distinction between Military and Law Enforcement Activities: Comments on Case 
Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), 
Provisional Measures Order (2019) European Journal of International Law, 30(3). 
19 X Shi and YC Chang, “Order of Provisional Measures in Ukraine versus Russia and Mixed Disputes 
concerning Military Activities” (2020) Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 11, 278–294.  
20 VJ Schatz and D Koval, “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships Through Kerch 
Strait: A Law of the Sea Perspective” (2019) Ocean Development & International Law, 50:2-3, 275-297. 
21  Y Tanaka “Release of a Detained Warship and Its Crew through Provisional Measures: A 
Comparative Analysis of the ARA Libertad and Ukraine v. Russia Cases” (2020) International Law 
Studies 96, p.223.  
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judges) and the PCA Award on preliminary objections in another ongoing case between 
Ukraine and Russia address the issue at hand and are actively utilized during the writing. 
 
1.4 Structure 
The structure of the thesis includes an introduction, the main part consisting of three chapters 
and a conclusion. In the second chapter, which follows the introduction, the author discusses 
the factual background of the 2018 incident near the Kerch Strait. This chapter includes a 
general comment on the disagreements regarding the status of waters between the Russian and 
Ukrainian coasts, which aims to put in perspective the events that unfolded in 2018 and the 
description of the naval confrontation between Russia and Ukraine on 25 November 2018. As 
it is not the focus of the thesis, the discussions regarding the legitimacy of the Russian or 
Ukrainian security operations in these waters are largely avoided, similar to the questions of 
the determination of the status of the Crimean Peninsula and the legality or illegality of the 
actions of the Russian Federation.  
The third chapter revolves around the dispute resolution mechanism in Part XV of the LOSC. 
Upon the general overview of the dispute settlement system of the LOSC, the author analyses 
the ways international courts and tribunals have applied the exceptions from compulsory 
dispute settlement in order to identify trends and inconsistencies. The last section of this chapter 
focuses specifically on the analysis of the application of the military exception and mentions 
the list of criteria that were previously put forward for identifying an incident as a military or 
law enforcement activity.  
The fourth chapter examines the relevance and weight of each of the criteria for drawing an 
objective distinction between law enforcement and military activities, including the evaluation 
of what it means when a dispute “concerns” military activities, type of vessels that took part in 
the incident, as well as the conduct, cause, purpose, and context surrounding the incident. This 
chapter both discusses these criteria theoretically and applies them to the present case study to 
determine whether the 2018 incident qualifies as a law enforcement or military activity.  
The last chapter includes the conclusion and summarizes the findings of the previous chapters. 
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Chapter II. The factual background of the 2018 incident 
between Russia and Ukraine near the Kerch Strait 
 
2.1 Comment on the status of the waters between the Russian 
and Ukrainian coasts   
Tensions with regard to the water areas between the Ukrainian and Russian coasts have been 
following the two States since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Russia and Ukraine had 
disagreements over the status of the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait and the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in this region. These tensions were exacerbated following the ousting from 
Ukraine of pro-Russian president Yanukovich, the subsequent occupation by Russia of the 
Crimean Peninsula and the establishment by Russian proxies of two unrecognized republics in 
eastern Ukraine (Figure 1 – General map).  
In the Black Sea, there was little disagreement between Russia and Ukraine over the status of 
waters prior to the occupation of Crimea in 2014. The occupation of the peninsula by Russia 
created a sovereignty dispute over this land territory. The legality or illegality of Russia’s 
actions is not pertinent to the fact that such a dispute indeed exists.22 In accordance with the 
“land dominates the sea” concept,23 Ukraine and Russia now both claim the coastal State rights 
over the maritime zones surrounding the Crimean Peninsula. The occupation of Crimea was 
not recognised by the majority of States24 and de jure, the status of Crimea and the surrounding 
maritime zones remains the same. However, the tension between the two States persists due to 
the de facto control of Russia over the territory, as well as the lack of opportunities for 
compulsory dispute settlement for Ukraine and veto rights of Russia in the United Nations 
Security Council. The ongoing daily armed confrontations between the Ukrainian army and the 
Russian-led armed formations in the eastern part of the Ukrainian mainland further aggravate 
the relationships between the two States. 
 
22 Coastal State Rights (Ukraine v Russia), PCA Award on the preliminary objection, n.11, para.178. 
23  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) Judgement [1969] ICJ Rep 1969 p.3 para.96.  
24 See, e.g., UNGA Res (27 March 2014) A/RES/68/262; UNGA Res (7 December 2020) A/RES/75/29, 
etc.  
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Unlike the Black Sea, the status of the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait was the subject of controversy 
between the littoral States even prior to the occupation of Crimea. Following lengthy 
negotiations, the Russian Federation and Ukraine reached an agreement in 2003, defining these 
waters as internal waters of both States based on the claimed historic title.25 The agreement 
further states that the Sea of Azov is delimited by the State border in accordance with the 
agreement between the States.26 However, the single bilateral treaty on the State border between 
Ukraine and Russia defines only the land border from the junction point of the borders of 
Ukraine, Russia and Belarus to the coast of the Taganrog Bay.27 The treaty further clarifies that 
the maritime boundary between the two States shall be delimited by a special agreement.28 No 
such agreement has been concluded thus far, de facto making the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait 
the area of Russian-Ukrainian condominium where both States enjoy equal rights in accordance 
with the regime of internal waters. That means, in particular, that all commercial vessels and 
military ships of both States enjoy full freedom of navigation in these waters.29  
Whereas Ukraine and Russia were close to establishing a maritime boundary in the Azov Sea, 
which would most likely be an adjustment of a median line (Figure 2 – Azov Sea as internal 
waters with a hypothetical median line), the disagreements over the status of the Kerch Strait 
prevented the States from delimiting both these areas. 30  Ukraine based its claims on the 
principle of uti possidetis juris, trying to define the boundary in accordance with the former 
administrative border and the distribution of administrative powers between Ukrainian and 
 
25 Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on cooperation in the use of the Sea of 
Azov and the Strait of Kerch (24 December 2003) (Official text is available in Russian on the website of 
the Presidential Administration of Russia: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1795 and in Ukrainian on the 
website of the Ukrainian Parliament: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_205) art. 1. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Russian-Ukrainian State Border (28 
January 2003) (Official text is available in Russian on the website of the Presidential Administration of 
Russia: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1653 and in Ukrainian on the website of the Ukrainian Parliament: 
http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_157) art. 1. 
28 Ibid art. 5.  
29 Agreement on the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch, n.25, art. 2(1). 
30 Сулакшин С.С., Национальная безопасность: научное и государственное управленческое 
содержание: материалы Всерос. науч. конф., 4 дек. 2009 г., Москва (Москва: Научный Эксперт 
2010) стр.689.  
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Russian Soviet Socialist Republics. 31  Russia categorically opposed these claims as the 
Ukrainian SSR had control over about 60% of the Azov Sea and the deeper and more widely 
used Kerch-Yenikalskyi channel of the Kerch Strait, while the Russian SSR, accordingly, 
controlled 40% of the Azov Sea and two shallow fairways in the Kerch Strait.32 The factual 
condominium in this area may be rather advantageous for Russia, as the international regulation 
of internal waters is scarce, allowing Russia to adopt stricter laws for foreign vessels. Although 
according to the 2003 agreement, Ukraine enjoys the same rights as Russia in the Azov Sea and 
Kerch Strait, Ukraine may fear inequity in the sharing of resources between the two States, as 
Russia is a much larger State with greater economic potential. Apart from that, the Russian de 
facto control over both coasts of the Kerch Strait and the majority of Azov Sea coasts leaves 
little say to Ukraine in the use of these waters.  
Ukraine has also made attempts to establish normal maritime zones in the Sea of Azov during 
the negotiations between the two States (Figure 3 – Hypothetical delimitation of the Azov Sea 
with normal maritime zones). Considering that the Parties were struggling to agree on a 
maritime boundary, in 2002, the Ukrainian Parliament registered a bill proposing the 
establishment of a 12-nautical-miles territorial sea in the Azov Sea and attempted to use it as 
leverage in the negotiations.33 In the recent PCA case, Ukraine reiterated that the Azov Sea and 
Kerch Strait “no longer qualify as internal waters” and consist of the territorial seas and EEZs 
of Russia and Ukraine.34 By making these claims, Ukraine attempts to allow wider international 
(as opposed to unilateral) regulation for these water areas than the regime of internal water 
foresees. In particular, the recognition of the Kerch Strait as the strait used for international 
navigation in the meaning of art. 34 of the LOSC would guarantee the regime of transit passage 
through the strait for all vessels that shall not be impeded (art. 38(1)) or suspended (art. 44). 
Despite these claims, Ukraine has not terminated the 2003 bilateral treaty that recognizes these 
waters as internal waters. This may be related to the fears of losing the benefits that this 
 
31 ОВ Задорожній 2014 n.16, стр.292-293. 
32 Ibid; Суржин А.С., ‘Международно-правовой режим Азовского моря и Керченского пролива’, 
Ежегодник морского права 2008 под ред. А.Л. Колодкина (Москва: Линкор 2009) стр.393-410, 
стр.405; Колодкин А. Л., Гуцуляк В. Н., Боброва Ю. В. Мировой океан. Международно-правовой 
режим. Основные проблемы (Москва: Статут 2007) стр.131.  
33 ОВ Задорожній 2014 n.16, стр.297.  
34 Coastal State Rights (Ukraine v Russia), PCA Award on the preliminary objection, n.11, paras.212-
215. 
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agreement provides. For instance, the definition of straits used for international navigation is 
vague, and there is no guarantee that the Kerch Strait will indeed be recognized as one, yet the 
2003 agreement already guarantees the freedom of navigation in the area for Ukrainian 
commercial and military vessels. At the moment, it is unlikely that Ukraine and Russia reach a 
new arrangement in the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait that is at least as beneficial for Ukraine as 
the current agreement due to the underlying territorial dispute over the Crimean Peninsula.  
The abovementioned disagreements with regard to the status of the waters between the Russian 
and Ukrainian coasts and the sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and, at times, 
opportunistic interpretation of the 2003 bilateral agreement and the LOSC create a situation 
where an escalation of the conflict becomes almost inevitable.  
 
2.2 Account of the events surrounding the 2018 incident near 
the Kerch Strait 
On 23-25 November 2018, three Ukrainian naval vessels, including two artillery boats of the 
Ukrainian navy Berdyansk and Nikopol, and the naval tugboat Yany Kapu, together with the 
crew of 24 servicemen on board, were navigating from the Ukrainian port of Odesa to the 
Ukrainian port of Mariupol (Figure 4 – Planned journey).35 A similar transit of Ukrainian naval 
vessels was conducted two months prior, in September 2018, without any incident.36  
On 24 November 2018, as the Ukrainian naval vessels were passing through the EEZ around 
the Crimean Peninsula, two Russian coast guard vessels started escorting the Ukrainian boats.37 
Prior to entering the territorial sea, the Ukrainian naval vessels received a notification from the 
 
35 Прикордонні кораблі РФ здійснили відверто агресивні дії проти кораблів ВМС ЗС України (25 
листопада 2018) Новини Військово-Морських Сил Збройних Сил України. Mode of access: 
https://navy.mil.gov.ua/prykordonni-korabli-rf-zdijsnyly-vidverto-agresyvni-diyi-proty-korabliv-vms-zs-
ukrayiny/ [last accessed 4 July 2021].  
36 Case Concerning the Detention of three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation) 
Provisional measures [2019] Public Sitting Held on 10 May 2019 (Minutes), 10 A.M. 
ITLOS/PV.19/C26/l/Rev.1 p.14. 
37 Reconstruction of the events in the Kerch strait (5 December 2018), Prosecutor General’s Office of 
Ukraine. Mode of access: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnU_F2LwHrI&t=46s [last accessed 5 
June 2021].  
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coast guard of the Russian Federation stating that the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea near the entrance to the strait was temporarily suspended for foreign military 
vessels.38 At different points in time, Russia cited various reasons for this suspension, including 
the failure of the Ukrainian vessels to notify the port administration about the passage 48 and 
24 hours in advance,39 harsh weather conditions and high traffic in the area.40 Nevertheless, the 
Ukrainian Navy claims to have failed to find evidence of the suspension of innocent passage 
where such a restriction would normally be published online.41 
On 25 November 2018, the captain of Berdyansk notified the Russian coast guard of the 
intention to enter the territorial sea and pass through the Kerch Strait. The Russian coast guard 
confirmed to have received the information but provided no further reply.42 Upon entering the 
territorial sea, the two Russian vessels escorting the Ukrainian vessels began manoeuvring and 
requested that the Ukrainian vessels leave the territorial sea.43 The Ukrainian vessels proceeded 
further, citing the 2003 bilateral agreement that guarantees freedom of navigation for all 
Ukrainian and Russian vessels in the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea.44 Other vessels of the Russian 
coast guard, including Don and Izumrud, attempted to intercept the Ukrainian vessels. As the 
Ukrainian vessels continued to sail towards the Kerch Strait, the Russian coast guard vessel 
Don intentionally rammed the Ukrainian tugboat Yany Kapu on two separate occasions, causing 
damage.45 As the Russian coast guard attempted to ram the artillery boat Berdyansk, the latter 
 
38 Case Concerning the Detention of three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation) 
Provisional measures [2019] ITLOS Case No. 26. Memorandum of the Government of the Russian 
Federation, para.14.  
39 О провокационных действиях кораблей ВМС Украины (26 ноября 2018) Федеральная Служба 
Безопасности Российской Федерации. Mode of access: 
http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm!id%3D10438315@fsbMessage.html [last accessed 11 
June 2021].  
40 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Memorandum of Russia n.38, para.12(c). 
41 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Minutes, n.36, p.14.  
42 Новини Військово-Морських Сил ЗСУ n.35.  
43 Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine n.37. 
44 Agreement on the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch, n.25, art. 2(1).  
45 M Cruickshank, “Investigating the Kerch Strait Incident” (30 November 2018) Bellingcat. Mode of 
access: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/30/investigating-the-kerch-strait-
incident/ [last accessed 11 June 2021]. 
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moved out of the way, which led to the collision between the Russian vessels Don and 
Izumrud.46  
Despite this confrontation, the Ukrainian vessels reached the entrance to the Kerch Strait, where 
they were prevented from passing through. A large container tanker was positioned to block 
the way in and out of the strait.47 After eight hours of waiting, the Ukrainian vessels decided to 
turn around and started navigating away from the Kerch Strait towards the exit from the 
territorial sea. The Russian coast guard ordered them to stop. A total of eleven Russian vessels, 
ten coast guard vessels and one warship, as well as four supporting aircrafts engaged in the 
pursuit of the Ukrainian vessels.48 Following the pursuit, around 12 nautical miles from the 
coast of Crimea, the Russian vessels surrounded the Ukrainian navy vessels and fired first 
warning, then targeted shots at Berdyansk, wounding three Ukrainian sailors and causing 
damage to the vessel. 49  The events described above are briefly visualized by Figure 5 – 
Chronology of the events. 
As a result of these events, the Ukrainian vessels were seized, and the crew on board was 
detained by the Russian Federation. Upon their capture, the Ukrainian servicemen were held in 
detention facilities and charged with illegally crossing the Russian border “as part of an 
organised group.”50 
Following the incident, Ukraine made use of the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism and 
brought the case before the ITLOS under art. 290 of the LOSC. On 25 May 2019, ITLOS issued 
an order on the prescription of provisional measures, demanding that Russia immediately 
release the Ukrainian naval vessels and the detained servicemen. The servicemen returned to 
Ukraine on 7 September 2019 following an agreement on prisoners’ exchange between Ukraine 
and Russia.51 Despite the significance of politics and diplomacy in making this exchange 
 
46 Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine n.37. 
47 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Minutes, n.36, p.15. 
48 Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine n.37. 
49 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Provisional measures n.2, para.31. 
50 Case Concerning the Detention of three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation) 
Provisional measures [2019] ITLOS Case No. 26. Request of Ukraine, n.3, para.11. 
51 В Бега, “Росія і Україна завершили обмін полонених: як це було (ОНЛАЙН)” (7 вересня 2019) 
Громадське Радіо. Mode of access: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-
europe/2018/11/30/investigating-the-kerch-strait-incident/ [last accessed 4 July 2021]. 
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happen, the order of the ITLOS has undoubtedly strengthened Ukraine’s demands for freedom 
of the captured sailors. On 20 November 2019, one day before the start of the PCA hearings in 
the ongoing case Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen, Russia 
returned the three arrested naval vessels back to Ukraine.52 
Although the ITLOS has decided to prescribe the provisional measures, this decision was by 
no means obvious. The main obstacle the Tribunal had to deal with was the possible lack of 
jurisdiction over this case.53  The next chapter explains the compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism of the LOSC in greater detail, but the crux of the issue lies in determining whether 
the Ukraine-Russia incident qualifies as a law enforcement or military activity. In the case of 
the latter, the Tribunal would lack jurisdiction to issue such an order. On top of that, while the 
ITLOS decided that the incident can constitute a law enforcement activity and found a basis for 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide upon its merits, it did so only prima facie, in 
accordance with Article 290(1) of the LOSC. The final decision on the jurisdiction and the 
potential decision on the merits of the case still rests with the PCA.  
 
Chapter III. Optional exceptions from the compulsory 
dispute settlement in the LOSC  
 
3.1 Overview of the compulsory dispute settlement system 
While many international multilateral treaties have provisions related to the settlement of 
disputes, few have been as successful in building a comprehensive dispute settlement system 
as the LOSC. The system developed within the LOSC has been truly innovative, progressive, 
and far-reaching 54  in the way it combined traditional consent-based and compulsory 
 
52 В Шрамович, “Без рацій, але зі зброєю. Як українські кораблі повертаються додому і навіщо це 
Росії” (20 листопада 2019) BBC News. Mode of access: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-
50487374 [last accessed 9 June 2021].  
53 Ukraine v Russian Federation, ITLOS Provisional measures n.2, para.50. 
54 R Rayfuse, “The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement under the Law of the Sea Convention” 
(2005) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 36(4), 683-712, p.683.  
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proceedings.55 Despite all the successes of the LOSC dispute resolution mechanism, the recent 
years saw an increase in attention to and tension around the few limitations and exceptions from 
the compulsory proceedings. The vagueness in the framing of some of these limitations and 
exceptions raises fears of expansive interpretation, which, in turn, may undermine the reliability 
of the compulsory dispute settlement system. 
All disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the LOSC are to be settled by 
peaceful means (art. 279) of the choice of the Parties to the dispute (art. 280). Peaceful means 
of dispute settlement are listed in art. 33 of the UN Charter56 and include inter alia “negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements.” 
A dispute was previously described in the case law as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, 
a conflict of legal views or interests, or the positive opposition of the claim of one party by the 
other.”57 In order to objectively establish the presence of a dispute, it must be shown that one 
party positively objects to the claim of another party.58 The presence of a dispute is the central 
element for triggering dispute settlement mechanisms.  
As confirmed by art. 280 of the LOSC, States are generally free to choose the peaceful means 
to settle a dispute among them. As long as all the parties to a dispute so agree, they are free to 
negotiate a settlement on their own, invite a third party to mediate or advise them throughout 
the process or resort to a judicial settlement involving a binding decision. A problem occurs 
when the parties fail to agree on the dispute settlement method or a specific procedure within a 
certain dispute settlement method, or the chosen method does not lead to the resolution of a 
dispute. To address this issue and help ensure settlement of disputes, some international treaties, 
including the LOSC, foresee compulsory procedures for dispute settlement entailing binding 
decisions, which solve both the problem of the choice of means and the inability of States to 
arrive at the resolution. The right to initiate a compulsory dispute settlement procedure in 
 
55 N Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 
2005) p.29. 
56 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
57 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment 
[1998] ICJ Rep 1998, p. 275 para.89.  
58 Ibid para.87. 
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accordance with the LOSC is subject to certain obligations, in particular, the obligation to 
exchange views (art. 283) and obligations arising from other international agreements that 
foresee another compulsory proceeding for dispute settlement entailing a binding decision (art. 
282).  
The procedures in the compulsory dispute settlement can be initiated by only one party to the 
dispute, while the other party is considered to have accepted the procedure by ratifying or 
acceding to the LOSC. The default procedure for the compulsory dispute settlement in 
accordance with the LOSC is the ad hoc arbitration, almost always administered by the PCA,59 
(art. 287(3 and 5)), unless both parties agree to submit their dispute to the ITLOS, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), or, for some categories of disputes, a special arbitral 
tribunal as per Annex VIII of the LOSC (art. 287(1,4)). The other exception from the default 
procedure is the obligation of States to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
of the ITLOS for disputes regarding the activities in the Area (art. 287(2)).  
Courts and tribunals listed in art.287(1) have jurisdiction over all disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC (art. 288(1)), as well as the interpretation and 
application of international agreements related to the purposes of the LOSC if a dispute is 
submitted to a court or tribunal in accordance with the agreement (art. 288(2)). The purposes 
of the Convention can be found in the Preamble and interpreted from its provisions and include, 
among other things, the establishment of a legal regime for the seas which will “promote the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans.”60 Some problems may arise in situations where a dispute 
in accordance with art. 287(1-2) also includes other incidental issues not governed by the 
Convention, be it a land sovereignty issue or issues related to the application of rules of the 
international humanitarian law. In this case, the determination of whether a court or tribunal 
can render a decision on merits without deciding on the incidental issues not covered by the 
 
59 PCA, Contribution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to the report of the United Nations Secretary-
General on oceans and the law of the sea, as at 18 June 2021 (2021) Executive summary. Mode of 
access: https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2020/06/2020/06/97401439-en-contribution-of-the-pca-to-the-report-
of-the-un-sg.pdf (last accessed 14 August 2021) p.1.  
60 LOSC, n.5, Preamble para.4. 
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LOSC is an important part of establishing jurisdiction.61 The authority to determine whether a 
court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a dispute rests with the said court or tribunal (art. 288(4)). 
The LOSC also refers to two types of preliminary proceedings that can be initiated within the 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism, namely the prompt release of vessels and crews (art. 
292) and prescription of provisional measures (art. 290). The prompt release proceedings can 
be resorted to only in cases of the violation by a coastal State of art. 73 of the LOSC, related to 
the enforcement of coastal State’s sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage 
the living resources in the EEZ, as well as arts. 220 and 226, related to the enforcement by a 
port State of laws and regulations regarding the protection of the marine environment. The cases 
of prompt release can be submitted to any court or tribunal as agreed by the parties to a dispute 
or, upon failure to reach such an agreement, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining 
State or to the ITLOS (art. 292(1)).  
Issues not related to the prompt release, as well as issues regarding the release of vessels and 
crews not covered by art. 73, 220, and 226, as is the case in the Ukraine v Russia dispute 
regarding the 2018 Kerch Strait incident, can be submitted to a court or tribunal agreed upon 
the parties or to the ITLOS to initiate proceedings for the prescription of provisional measures 
(art. 290(1,5)). A court or tribunal can prescribe provisional measures it deems appropriate “to 
preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the 
marine environment” (art. 290(1)). In order to prescribe provisional measures, a court or 
tribunal must establish that the court or tribunal to which a dispute was submitted has prima 
facie jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the case (art. 290(1,5)). 
The compulsory dispute settlement procedures are subject to limitations listed in art. 297 of the 
LOSC, as well as optional exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement listed in art. 298. 
During the negotiations on the LOSC, some issues were deemed too sensitive to be subject to 
the compulsory proceedings entailing binding decisions.62 The limitations from the compulsory 
proceedings apply to certain disputes related to the interpretation or application of the 
 
61 A Proelss, “The limits of jurisdiction ratione materiae of UNCLOS tribunals” (2018) Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics 46 (2018), pp.47-60, pp.55-56.  
62 K Zou and Q Ye, “Interpretation and Application of Article 298 of the Law of the Sea Convention in 
Recent Annex VII Arbitrations: An Appraisal” (2017) Ocean Development & International Law 48:3-4, 
331-344 p.332. 
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provisions of the LOSC with regard to coastal States’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction (art. 
297(1)), marine scientific research (art. 297(2)) and fisheries (art. 297(3)). Disputes excluded 
from the compulsory dispute settlement due to the limitations in art. 297 can be resolved by any 
peaceful means agreed upon by both States or submitted to a conciliation procedure entailing 
non-binding decisions under Annex V section 2 of the LOSC at the request of any party to the 
dispute.   
States also have the right to exclude any or all categories of disputes listed in art. 298 of the 
LOSC from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures by issuing an according declaration. 
The article also allows States to exclude these categories of disputes specifically with regard to 
any or all compulsory dispute settlement procedures, such as ITLOS, ICJ or an arbitral tribunal. 
The PCA previously confirmed that one of the differences between the limitations in art. 297 
and optional exceptions in art. 298 is that the latter must not be specifically invoked during the 
proceedings, as States confirm their intentions in written form in advance.63 Out of 168 parties 
to the LOSC, 40 States chose to exclude one or more categories of disputes from the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures in accordance with art. 298.64  
Art. 298 became a compromise necessary to accommodate the interests of States within a 
nearly-globally accepted legal regime.65 The categories of disputes that can be excluded from 
the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in accordance with art. 298 are the following: 
those concerning the interpretation or application of arts. 15, 74 and 83 relating to the sea 
boundaries delimitation (art. 298(1)(a)(i)); those involving historic bays and titles (art. 
298(1)(a)(i)); those concerning military activities (art. 298(1)(b)); those concerning law 
enforcement activities with regard to the limitations on the applicability of mandatory dispute 
settlement procedures under arts. 297(2) and (3) (art. 298(1)(b)), as well as those disputes in 
respect of which the United Nations Security Council exercises its functions (art. 298(1)(c)). 
 
63 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China), Award [2016] PCA Case No 2013-19, ICGJ 495, 
para. 1156. 
64 United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Chapter 
XXI 6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Declarations and Reservations). Mode of 
access: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [last accessed 6 July 2021].  
65 K Zou and Q Ye (2017), n.62, pp.331-332. 
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The various conditions for compulsory dispute settlement procedures discussed in this section 
create jurisdictional challenges for judicial dispute resolution. The following section focuses 
on the exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement and reviews common trends and 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of art. 298 and some aspects of art. 297 by courts and 
tribunals. Although the decisions of international courts and tribunals in art. 287 are not 
precedential, meaning that they have no binding force except between the parties in respect of 
their specific case,66 the authority exerted by these institutions is transferrable to their decisions. 
The interpretation performed by esteemed international courts and tribunals can help reconcile 
opposing views towards a legal issue and promote the progressive development of international 
law.  
 
3.2 Interpretation by international courts and tribunals of the 
exceptions from the compulsory dispute resolution 
The interpretation and application of art. 298 of the LOSC has been central to several recent 
international disputes. States that issued a declaration in accordance with art. 298 can argue for 
the lack of jurisdiction of courts and tribunals in dealing with issues these States chose to 
exclude from the compulsory dispute settlement. However, the definition and the scope of the 
categories of disputes of art. 298 is open to interpretation. Additionally, disputes between States 
are often complex and concern several legal questions that may be both related and unrelated 
to the issues listed in art. 298. The analysis of the way courts and tribunals applied this article 
in the past can therefore assist us in the interpretation of the military exception in the context 
of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine regarding the events that unfolded near the Kerch 
Strait in 2018. This section focuses on general aspects of art. 298, followed by an overview of 
such exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement as those relating to sea boundary 
delimitations, historic bays and titles, and law enforcement activities. 
Art. 298 was briefly brought up in the Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration,67 where the 
PCA had to address the issue of whether this provision can be interpreted a contrario, in 
 
66 ICJ Statute n.12, art.59; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (10 December 
1982) 1833 UNTS 561, art.33(2). 
67 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award [2015] PCA Case 
No. 2011-03. 
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particular with regard to land sovereignty disputes. Mauritius argued that since land sovereignty 
disputes are not excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement in art. 298, then they must 
be automatically included under the LOSC dispute resolution system, as long as the dispute as 
a whole is about the interpretation and application of the Convention.68 The Tribunal reached 
the opposite conclusion. Reading into the provisions of art. 297 and 298(1)(a) of the LOSC, the 
Tribunal found it apparent that States are especially sensitive to their sovereign rights and 
maritime territory.69 Both provisions were designed to strike a compromise between issues 
related to State sovereignty and compulsory dispute settlement. It is, therefore, more likely that 
if the drafters of the LOSC intended to view disputes regarding land sovereignty as “concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Convention,” they would indeed have included an 
option to opt out of such disputes, similar to other disputes mentioned in art. 298. 70 
Additionally, art. 298 is far from being the only way to exclude disputes from the compulsory 
dispute settlement.  
In the South China Sea case,71 the Tribunal had to deal with a number of objections to the 
jurisdiction arising from arts. 297 and 298 of the LOSC, since China excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement all the categories of disputes mentioned in art. 298.72 Before 
issuing the final Award, the Tribunal reviewed issues related to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility in preliminary proceedings. 73  In order to be settled in these preliminary 
proceedings, issues of the jurisdiction and admissibility have to possess an “exclusively 
preliminary character.”74 To follow this procedure, the Tribunal first examines if it has all the 
necessary facts to deal with an objection and determines whether it would be forced to make a 
judgement on some of the elements of the dispute’s merits.75 Notably, this procedure differs 
from the ITLOS proceedings in the Ukraine v Russia case76 regarding the establishment of the 
 
68 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, PCA Award n.67, para.193. 
69 Ibid, para.216. 
70 Ibid, para.217. 
71 South China Sea, PCA Final Award n.63. 
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73 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China), Award on jurisdiction and admissibility [2015] PCA 
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jurisdiction prima facie in order to issue an order for the prescription of provisional measures 
as per art. 290. In order to prescribe provisional measures, a court or tribunal “must satisfy itself 
that the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear prima facie to afford a basis on which the 
jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal might be founded,”77 rather than either render a 
final decision on the jurisdiction or leave out the questions that need to be reviewed in 
conjunction with the merits. During the preliminary proceedings in the South China Sea case, 
the Tribunal reserved the right to review most of the questions regarding its jurisdiction based 
on arts. 297 and 298 in conjunction with the decision on the merits.78 
In the decision on the merits,79 the South China Sea Tribunal dealt both with issues regarding 
the sea boundary delimitation and the historic bays and titles. With regard to the first category 
of disputes that can be excluded from compulsory proceedings per art. 298, the language “sea 
boundary delimitations” used in art. 298(1)(a)(i) is not found anywhere else in the Convention, 
so it seems reasonable that its interpretation in good faith would not end up being too 
restrictive.80 In the conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia, the PCA suggested that 
“disputes concerning the interpretation or application of arts. 15, 74 and 83 relating to the sea 
boundaries delimitation” as per art. 298(1)(a)(i) involve the actual delimitation and also the 
question of the transitional period and practical provisional arrangements pending 
delimitation.81 
In the South China Sea case, the Tribunal drew a distinction between disputes concerning the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries and disputes concerning entitlement to maritime zones.82 
While a maritime boundary can be delimited only between States with adjacent or opposite 
coasts which have overlapping entitlements, disputes concerning the existence of entitlement 
may exist even without any overlapping claims.83 The Tribunal further noted that only the 
 
77 “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order [2012] ITLOS Reps 2012, p. 332, 
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78 South China Sea, PCA Award on jurisdiction and admissibility, n.73, paras.397-412. 
79 South China Sea, PCA Final Award n.63. 
80 K Zou and Q Ye (2017), n.62, p.335. 
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disputes concerning the delimitation of maritime boundaries, and not those on the existence of 
entitlement, can be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement via art. 298(1)(a).84 
The Tribunal went on to point out that disputes regarding the status of land features as “rocks” 
or “islands” per art. 121 of the LOSC or “low tide elevations” as per art. 13 cannot be excluded 
from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures based on art. 298(1)(a)(i) relating to the 
delimitation of the maritime boundaries,85 even though the status of a land feature can affect 
the delimitation. However, with regard to the Philippines submissions regarding the activities 
of China in what the Philippines perceived to be its EEZ, the PCA indicated that its jurisdiction 
depends on whether it can confirm that no overlapping claims can exist in this area.86 The 
presence of overlapping claims depended on whether the Tribunal recognises any of the land 
features in the Spratly Islands as “islands” that generate entitlements to an EEZ and continental 
shelf.87 If there could be overlapping claims in the area, the Tribunal would be precluded from 
recognising that the maritime territory belongs to one State or the other, as it is barred from 
delimiting the area due to China’s declaration in accordance with art. 298(1)(a)(i), and 
therefore, would not be able to confirm that China’s activities indeed took place in the EEZ of 
the Philippines. The Tribunal went on to decide on the merits of the Philippines submissions, 
as it found no islands in the area that can generate overlapping entitlements and, accordingly, 
concluded that no delimitation is required or even possible in the area.88 
With regard to the disputes “involving historic bays and titles” included in art. 298(1)(a)(i), the 
Tribunal confirmed that it is not necessary for such dispute to involve the question of 
delimitation to be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.89 Based on the 
language of the provision, this category of disputes is distinct from the sea boundary 
delimitation disputes. However, the PCA also made sure to draw a distinction between “historic 
rights” and “historic titles,” where the latter only refer to “historic sovereignty over land or 
maritime areas” and no other rights falling short of sovereignty.90 Similarly, the term “historic 
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85 Ibid, paras.400-401, 403-404.  
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bay” was interpreted to mean bays for which a State claims a historic title (sovereignty).91 
Having analysed China’s claims in the South China Sea, the Tribunal concluded that these 
constitute historic rights claims, which do not correspond to claims over a historic title, 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.92 Therefore, the Tribunal rejected the notion that 
it lacks jurisdiction based on art. 298(1)(a)(i) regarding disputes involving historic bays and 
titles.  
An argument could be made against the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its interpretation of 
disputes involving historic bays and titles. It goes as follows: the reason art. 298(1)(a)(i) refers 
only to “historic bays” and “historic titles” is that these are the terms used in the Convention 
(e.g., art. 10(6) or 15 of the LOSC), while disputes involving historic rights are already excluded 
from the compulsory dispute settlement since they fall outside the disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC per art. 288(1). 93  If the Tribunal establishes 
jurisdiction over the dispute, it must do so with reference to a specific provision in the LOSC. 
Nevertheless, even if historic rights are not included in the LOSC, the disputes relating to issues 
not covered by the Convention are not equivalent to disputes optionally excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement with a declaration per art. 298. In the case of the former, a court 
or tribunal may make findings and ancillary determinations of law as necessary for the 
resolution of a dispute, as long as the main object of the claim lies within the interpretation or 
application of the Convention.94 A court or tribunal may also address all issues that do not 
require it to render a decision on an issue outside of the scope of the LOSC, even when these 
issues are closely related.95 Even so, the Tribunal’s clarification regarding the relationship 
between historic bays, titles and rights on the one hand and disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC on the other hand could be helpful for a better 
understanding of the jurisdictional challenges this category of disputes faces.  
Regarding art. 298(1)(b), the law enforcement activity at sea can be generally defined as “the 
exercise of policing powers by states against vessels within their jurisdictional reach in order 
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to maintain public order.”96 Such activity is often premised on a hierarchical relationship and 
assumes inequality between the enforcing authority and the object of the law enforcement 
action.97 The PCA confirmed during the South China Sea preliminary proceedings that the law 
enforcement activities exception from the compulsory dispute settlement in art. 298(1)(b) is not 
applicable in the territorial sea, as it only relates to the activities in the EEZ listed in art. 297(2) 
and (3).98 This limitation, however, does not apply to the military exception. Art. 298(1)(b) 
received a similar treatment in the Arctic Sunrise case, where the Tribunal reaffirmed that the 
law enforcement activities exception concerns activities only “in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under art. 
297, paragraph 2 or 3” and cannot exclude any other disputes.99 Art. 297(2) and (3) refer, 
respectively, to provisions of the LOSC with regard to marine scientific research and fisheries 
in the EEZ. The Tribunal further confirmed that based on arts. 309 and 310 of the Convention, 
a State may only exclude from the compulsory dispute settlement disputes listed in art. 298 and 
cannot create an exclusion of a wider scope than permitted by the article.100 The restrictive 
interpretation of law enforcement activities in art. 298(1)(b) was also supported by ITLOS 
Judge Treves, as otherwise, one could conflate law enforcement activities with the sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction they aim to protect.101 
Overall, it seems that the tribunals often lean towards narrower interpretations when it comes 
to the exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement in art. 298, while generally staying in 
line with the wording of the respective provisions. The interpretation of the historic bays and 
titles exception by the South China Sea Tribunal is, perhaps, the most creative, as the LOSC 
gives little indication to the definition of historic bays and titles and their relationship with other 
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historic rights.  The following section focuses on the features and nuances of the military 
exception from the compulsory dispute settlement and evaluates whether this tendency is also 
observable with regard to this type of disputes. 
 
3.3 The military exception 
By virtue of art. 298(1)(b), States can choose not to accept compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures with regard to “disputes concerning military activities, including military activities 
by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service.” Out of 40 parties to 
the LOSC that made a declaration in accordance with art. 298, 25 States, including both Russia 
and Ukraine, opted out of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures for disputes concerning 
military activities.102 The declaration of the Russian Federation exactly recreates the wording 
of art. 298 with respect to military activities.103 
The wording of art. 298(1)(b) is quite vague. In particular, it gives an indication that only 
disputes that “concern” military activities may be excluded, so the practice of courts and 
tribunals in interpreting the word “concerning” will be of relevance. The article further 
mentions the types of vessels that may be involved in military activities and clarifies that these 
are not restricted to military ships but can also involve “government vessels and aircraft 
engaged in non-commercial service.” This part also calls on a short consideration regarding the 
types of vessels involved in the incident between Russia and Ukraine near the Kerch Strait and 
the relevance of this factor for qualifying activities as those relating to military or law 
enforcement.  
The Ukraine v Russia case is the first time the ITLOS was called on to interpret the military 
activities exception in art. 298(1)(b).104 Prior to that, the provision was interpreted only by the 
PCA.105 The ITLOS pointed out that the disputes relating to the military exception have to be 
decided upon on the case-by-case basis, claiming that the distinction between military and law 
enforcement activities has to be based on “objective evaluation of the nature of the activities in 
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question, taking into account the relevant circumstances in each case.”106 The individual cases 
where a party invokes the military exception being difficult enough, the “case-by-case” 
approach makes it especially challenging to develop an objective and independent test for 
distinguishing between military and law enforcement activities for all future cases.  
Concerning the specific factors that have to be taken into account for characterising activities 
as law enforcement or military, the ITLOS decided to leave out the positions of States regarding 
their own activities in the case between Russia and Ukraine.107 This was not the case in the 
South China Sea arbitration, where the PCA decided not to deem China’s construction activities 
as military due to China’s consistent and official claims that the purpose for these activities was 
civilian in nature, namely the improvement of working and living condition of the population.108 
There is not necessarily a controversy between these two decisions, as the statements of Ukraine 
and Russia regarding the incident near the Kerch Strait were at times lacking consistency. Both 
States brought up each other’s statements made earlier outside of the proceedings as arguments 
for the justification of their own position.109 However, it is also questionable whether the 
position of States regarding their own activities should ever be a decisive factor in these kinds 
of disputes unless the concept of estoppel can be invoked. Issues related to the security of a 
State often involve sensitive information, and public statements of States may therefore lack 
accuracy when it comes to their activities of military nature. Arguably, inaccurate official 
information regarding security issues should not preclude States from enjoying their right to 
exclude certain types of disputes from the compulsory dispute settlement, as it only highlights 
how sensitive these issues may be to a State. 
In Russia v Ukraine, the Tribunal highlighted three relevant circumstances that it needed to 
analyse in order to determine whether the arrest and detention of the Ukrainian vessels and crew 
took place within a military or law enforcement operation.110 These are: the specific actions of 
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Page 27 of 62 
the vessels in question (conduct),111 the cause of the incident,112 and the context in which the 
force was used.113The Tribunal found the above-mentioned circumstances relevant for the 
present case, which leaves the question of whether other possible factors can be of relevance in 
other cases to determine the status of activities as military or law enforcement in nature. For 
example, in his separate opinion, Judge Gao points out the importance of the intent and purpose 
of the activities for the evaluation of the incident,114  which is a factor related to but not 
equivalent to any of the factors chosen by the Tribunal. The conduct is different from the intent, 
as for evaluating the conduct, we need to answer the question of what was done, and for intent 
– why it was done. The cause also differs from the intent, as it is directed towards the past, while 
the intent focuses on the future. The Judge also added that domestic judicial proceedings in 
Russia might be a relevant factor for the qualification of the dispute, although it should not be 
a decisive one,115 similar to “the international actions, official positions, and legal documents 
of the Parties.”116 
Since the hearings for the prescription of provisional measures require jurisdiction only prima 
facie, the ITLOS did not need to go much further than finding that the dispute appears to have 
a basis on which jurisdiction for the arbitral tribunal can be found.117 This may mean that it 
would be enough for the Tribunal to establish that the dispute has features of the law 
enforcement activity, without addressing whether there are also features of military activity and 
which features are more prominent in the case. In this regard, Judge Gao pointed out that 
military and law enforcement activities are not mutually exclusive, and some activities may be 
of mixed nature.118 It may be the case that in order to assess the jurisdiction in full, the Arbitral 
Tribunal will have to determine whether law enforcement or military element is predominant 
in the case regarding the Kerch Strait incident.   
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Another debatable aspect of the military activities exception concerns the relationship between 
the military activities in the meaning of art. 298(1)(b) and the activities regulated by the 
international humanitarian law (IHL). The theories around the relationship between the LOSC 
and the law of naval warfare, which is part of the IHL, vary.119 However, the most widely 
accepted view envisages that the LOSC applies during the time of peace and is not aimed at 
replacing the customary rules on naval warfare, at least in the relationship between the warring 
parties.120 If the LOSC and IHL are independent and not interconnected regimes and military 
activities in the meaning of art. 298(1)(b) are only applicable in the time of conflict and are 
fully governed by the IHL, the inclusion of the military activities exception from the mandatory 
dispute settlement would almost seem redundant since the disputes arising from the IHL are 
already excluded based on art. 288. The article limits the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals 
within the compulsory dispute settlement system to the interpretation and application of the 
LOSC and, in some cases, other agreements related to the purposes of the LOSC (art. 288(1,2)), 
so disputes, where the independent regime of the IHL applies, would naturally be excluded 
from the LOSC dispute settlement mechanism. 
The activities governed by the IHL seem to indeed qualify as military activities in the meaning 
of art. 298(1)(b). The whole purpose of the IHL, otherwise called the law of armed conflict or 
jus in bello, is to provide the rule of conduct in relation to armed confrontations between two 
or more States or States and non-State actors as lex specialis to the rules of the LOSC. In other 
words, this is the area of international law that governs military activities in the context of 
armed conflicts. That would, in turn, mean that activities governed by the IHL are excluded 
from the LOSC compulsory dispute settlement mechanism based both on arts. 288(1) and 
298(1)(b). However, the extent of the overlap between the IHL and the LOSC military 
exception is not clear. Art. 288 almost suggests that the military activities exception in art. 
298(1)(b) is broader than military activities in the context of the IHL, as the drafters of the 
LOSC were prompted to create a special optional exception from the compulsory dispute 
settlement. Based on these considerations, it is likely the case that the art. 298(1)(b) military 
exception covers a broader range of activities than those governed by the IHL. In addition to 
 
119 N Klein (2005), n.55, p.283. 
120 Ibid, p.283; Schatz VJ and Koval D (2019), n.20, p.276. 
 
Page 29 of 62 
the activities governed by the IHL, it would also cover peacetime military activities, such as 
military exercises, construction works for military purposes or military surveillance.121  
Based on the discussion in this section, chapter IV analyses the following criteria for 
distinguishing between military and law enforcement activities: to what extent the dispute 
“concerns” military activities, the types of vessels involved, the conduct, the cause, the purpose, 
and the context of the incident. The issue of the applicability of the IHL is analysed in 
conjunction with the context of the incident. The analysis is performed in light of the factual 
background of the Ukraine-Russia incident and the general trends in jurisprudence on optional 
exceptions identified in this chapter. 
 
Chapter IV. Criteria for distinguishing between law 
enforcement and military activities  
 
4.1 Disputes “concerning” military activities 
The first general issue for drawing the line between military and law enforcement activities for 
the purpose of dispute resolution is the interpretations of the wording of art. 298(1)(b) to 
determine what kinds of disputes “concern” military activities.  
 The PCA previously assessed the term “concerning” as it is used in art.298(1)(b) by contrasting 
it with such terms as “arising from” or “involving,” which appear to be “open to a more 
expansive interpretation.”122 The term “concerning,” on the other hand, limits the military 
activities exception to “those disputes whose subject matter is military activities.” 123  The 
Tribunal went on to point out that a causal or historical link between military activities and the 
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dispute in question is insufficient to trigger the military activities exception, as specific acts that 
are subject of complaint within the dispute must constitute military activities.124  
Analysing the word “concerning” in a different context, the ITLOS seems to have adopted a 
broader interpretation. While referring to disputes “concerning the arrest or detention,” the 
ITLOS explained that the use of the term “concerning” does not extend exclusively to articles 
containing the words “arrest” or “detention,” but also to other provisions of the LOSC “having 
a bearing on the arrest or detention of vessels.” 125  In this case, the ITLOS analysed the 
declaration of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in accordance with art. 287 of the LOSC, in 
which it chose ITLOS as a procedure for the compulsory dispute settlement only for disputes 
concerning the arrest or detention. Nevertheless, the ITLOS found that this declaration did not 
preclude it from deciding on other issues, as long as they are connected to the detention and 
arrest.126 This interpretation may signify that the word “concerning” is generally interpreted 
more narrowly in the context of exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement. 
The issue was also brought up in the South China Sea case, where the Tribunal pointed out the 
difference between “disputes concerning military activities” and “military activities” as such.127 
The Tribunal further clarified that the dispute itself must concern military activities rather than 
the State’s military forces being employed in relation to the dispute.128 Therefore, the Tribunal 
evaluated whether the military activities were an aggravation dependent on the underlying 
dispute between the Philippines and China or constituted a distinct dispute to which the optional 
exception would be applicable.129  
Going back to the Ukraine v Russia dispute, an argument can be made (and has, in part, been 
made during the ITLOS proceedings)130 that the dispute itself concerned the navigation rights 
of the Ukrainian navy, and the confrontation ensued in relation to the different interpretation of 
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the passage regime by the parties to the dispute. Accordingly, the military activities would not 
be at the core of the dispute, as the quasi-military confrontation occurred as a consequence of 
the main dispute. Such interpretation, however, would seem unnecessarily narrow. While 
differences with regard to the passage regime of the Kerch Strait were the catalyst of the dispute, 
the dispute involves multiple separate issues and still revolves around Russia’s use of force 
against the Ukrainian navy vessels and the subsequent arrest of the vessels and the crew. If the 
actions of the Russian coast guard are indeed military in nature, the dispute “concerns” them in 
the same manner as it concerns the navigational rights of Ukraine in the Kerch Strait. Similarly, 
in the South China Sea case, the Tribunal found that the interaction between the Chinese and 
Philippine military was a distinct matter that would be excluded from the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedure if characterised as a military activity.131 
The broader interpretation of the disputes concerning military activities also seems to be 
supported by the language used in other non-English authentic texts of the LOSC. Pursuant to 
art. 320 of the LOSC, “the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic.” This is confirmed by art. 33 of the VCLT that also provides that where there 
is a difference in the meaning of authentic texts in different languages, “the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.” As 
per art. 31(1) of the VCLT treaties shall be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.” Therefore, the analysis of the original text is 
the primary element in the treaty interpretation, while the case law, in principle, belongs to 
subsidiary means for the determination of law.132  
Following this thread, the wording of art. 298(1)(b) in most of the other authentic texts seems 
to be less strong than in the English one (for example, “касающихся” in Russian, “relatifs” in 
French, “relativas” in Spanish, or “المتعلقة” in Arabic). These terms correspond more closely to 
the English phrases “relating to” or “having to do with” that seem to establish a weaker link 
between a dispute in question and military activities than the word “concerning” and allow for 
a more expansive interpretation. Such phrasing may suggest that issues closely related and 
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interdependent with military activities can also be excluded from the compulsory dispute 
settlement based on art. 298(1)(b).  
It is most likely that if the use of force against the Ukrainian naval vessels constitutes a military 
activity, at least some issues within the dispute would concern military activities and, therefore, 
be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. It seems, however, based on 
the previous interpretations done by tribunals, as well as on the wording of most of the authentic 
texts of the LOSC, that disputes on issues bearing an inseparable connection to the military 
activities and having a direct, impactful relationship with military activities may also be subject 
to the exclusion from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.  
At the same time, disputes between States are rarely one-dimensional. A single dispute may 
involve both questions related and unrelated to military activities. For example, in the Ukraine 
v Russia case, the issues regarding the passage rights can be decided upon in isolation from the 
armed confrontation that can potentially qualify as a military activity. If an issue within a 
dispute does not require a judgement on issues concerning military activities, it should not be 
swept out of the compulsory dispute settlement based on the military activities exception. 
Indeed, it could be problematic for the international dispute resolution system if States could 
get away with violating their obligations in the law of the sea simply by resorting to military 
force.  
 
4.2 Types of vessels 
Among all the criteria for distinguishing between law enforcement and military activities, art. 
298(1)(b) gives the most indication with regard to the type of vessels involved in the incident. 
It mentions that military activities that can be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement 
include those conducted by “government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial 
service.” 
The article does not use the term “warship,” but it is implied that warships normally engage in 
military activities. In this thesis, the terms “naval vessels”, “military ships”, and “warships” are 
used synonymously and refer to vessels under the control of the armed forces of a State. The 
LOSC defines a warship in art. 29 as: 
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a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks 
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under 
regular armed forces discipline. 
This definition is almost identical to the one used in the San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,133 a non-binding document that reflects the binding 
customary international law on naval warfare. However, the San Remo Manual also includes 
the term “auxiliary vessel,” which often receives a similar treatment to warships and means “a 
vessel, other than a warship, that is owned by or under the exclusive control of the armed forces 
of a State and used for the time being on government non-commercial service.”134 This seems 
to indicate that the main distinguishing factor for the types of vessels that normally engage in 
military activities is the fact that they remain under the command of the armed forces.  
It is at the discretion of flag States to designate their ships as warships. States are also free to 
decide which governmental bodies or agencies belong to the armed forces and which belong to 
the law enforcement. The PCA pointed out that there is no consistent practice with regard to 
what tasks are to be performed by military vessels and “[f]orces that some governments treat 
as civilian or law enforcement forces may be designated as military by others, even though they 
may undertake comparable tasks.”135 For example, while most States designate the coast guard 
as a law enforcement agency, China has recently passed a law, which transfers the coast guard 
under the command of the armed forces.136 Moreover, military vessels also may engage in non-
military activities, such as “disaster relief, evacuations, or the reestablishment of public 
order.”137 
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Even though the LOSC uses different terms for “warships” and “government vessels operated 
for non-commercial purposes” or “ships clearly marked and identifiable as being on 
government service and authorized to that effect,” the Convention does not often make a 
distinction between them. The term “warship” is used without the mention of other types of 
government vessels only in art. 29, which defines the term, art. 30, which asserts the right of 
coastal States to require warships to leave the territorial sea under certain conditions, as well as 
art. 110 regarding the right to visit. In other instances (e.g., arts. 31, 32, 95 together with 96, 
102, 107, 111(5), 224, 236, and 298(1)(b)), the Convention applies its rules equally to warships 
and other government ships either engaged in non-commercial service or clearly marked and 
authorized by the government.  
While only vessels belonging to the Ukrainian navy were involved in the incident on Ukraine’s 
side, Russia’s side consisted almost exclusively of vessels belonging to the Russian coast guard. 
In Russia, the coast guard is included in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, 
a federal law enforcement agency.138 Apart from the coast guard vessels, a Ka-52 combat 
helicopter took part in the pursuit of the Ukrainian naval vessels, while the corvette ASW 
Suzdalets, belonging to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, stayed in the vicinity to monitor the 
situation.139 All of the vessels involved in the incident belonged to the respective government 
and were not engaged in commercial service.  
In the South China Sea case, the Tribunal addressed the issue of the Chinese government vessels 
trying to prevent the resupply and rotation of the Philippine navy. Similar to the situation with 
the Russian corvette ASW Suzdalets, the Chinese military vessels were in the vicinity at the 
time for monitoring and did not get physically involved in the activities of the Chinese 
government vessels.140 Nevertheless, the Tribunal described this involvement of military forces 
on one side and military and paramilitary forces on the other as a “quintessentially military 
situation,” based on the types of vessels involved and their conduct.141 
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In the Ukraine v Russia case, Ukraine argued that “it is not the type of vessel, but rather the 
type of activity the vessel is engaged in, that matters.”142 The ITLOS generally supported this 
view and highlighted the blurring of the traditional distinction between naval and law 
enforcement vessels, as it is not uncommon for States to employ both types of vessels to work 
collaboratively on the same task.143 The Tribunal clarified that the type of vessels involved 
might be a relevant factor for distinguishing between military and law enforcement activities, 
but the final decision cannot be based solely upon it.144 This view is also supported by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on the Second Geneva 
Convention 1949,145 which states that “armed conflict… may come into existence even if the 
armed confrontation does not involve military personnel but rather non-military State agencies 
such as paramilitary forces, border guards or coast guards.”146 
The blurring of the line between the roles of law enforcement and military vessels and little 
significance given by the tribunals to the types of vessels involved also have the opposite effect: 
as the PCA pointed out, the fact that military vessels were involved in an incident is not 
sufficient for triggering the military activities exception.147 At the same time, when it comes to 
forcible actions, it can be argued that any attempt to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction 
against a foreign warship automatically turns this attempt into the threat or use of force.148 This 
is because, as the Tribunal held in the ARA Libertad case, “a warship is an expression of the 
sovereignty of the State whose flag it flies,”149 so a forcible action against it amounts to a 
forcible action against the State’s sovereignty.  Moreover, law enforcement activities suggest a 
hierarchy between the authority enforcing laws and the object of the enforcing action, which is 
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absent in the relationship of equality between warships that enjoy immunity under the LOSC.150 
This would, in turn, suggest that the law enforcement action against warships, whether it is 
exercised in response to a violation of international or national laws, should normally be 
considered at least unlawful but also likely amount to military action.151 
The types of vessels involved in the Kerch Strait incident, including both warships and law 
enforcement vessels, do not prevent the qualification of the incident as a military activity within 
the meaning of art. 298(1)(b). At face value, the fact of involvement of military and other 
government vessels is not decisive for the qualification, as these types of vessels can also 
engage in law enforcement activities. However, taking into consideration that the Russian coast 
guard vessels engaged in the use of force against the Ukrainian naval vessels, while likely 
having no law enforcement powers to do so, this criterion reveals the higher probability of the 
military nature of the Kerch Strait incident.  
 
4.3 Conduct  
The conduct of vessels was selected by the ITLOS as the first out of three relevant 
circumstances for determining the nature of the incident in the Ukraine v Russia case.152 This 
is hardly surprising since the art. 298(1)(b) exception is focused precisely on disputes 
concerning military activities and not, for example, the military forces as such. It is, therefore, 
highly pertinent to the case to analyze the specific actions of the vessels in question and, in 
particular, “the manner in which the Parties deployed their forces and the way in which Parties 
engaged one another at sea.”153 
The South China Sea Tribunal confirmed that the relevant question for the application of art. 
298(1)(b) is whether the dispute concerns activities that are military in nature rather than 
whether military forces were involved in connection with the dispute.154 Similarly, in order to 
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characterise Suriname’s actions as a threat of military action or law enforcement, the PCA 
analysed the conduct of the Surinamese navy based on the testimony of witnesses.155 
In addressing the conduct of the parties in the Ukraine v Russia case, the ITLOS stressed that 
the Ukrainian navy was engaged in the planned passage through the Kerch Strait, which led to 
the arrest.156 In view of the Tribunal, the passage of warships per se generally does not amount 
to military activity.157 This is because the passage regimes apply under the LOSC to all ships – 
whether warships or commercial vessels.158 In connection to this, Judge Jesus more openly 
stated in his separate opinion that warships are not required to inform coastal States or request 
authorisation in order to engage in innocent passage through the territorial sea.159  
This point was questioned by Kraska, who noted that by the same logic, military intelligence 
gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations could also not be considered a military 
activity since both naval and civilian vessels can do surveys.160 Similarly, Ishii argued that the 
passage of warships in the territorial sea is one of the most controversial issues in the LOSC, 
making it difficult to confidently say that this issue is not military in nature.161 At the same 
time, von Heinegg expressed an opinion that “the continuing presence in the territorial sea of a 
foreign warship which has not complied with a demand to leave may be considered a use of 
force not only under the jus ad bellum, but also under international humanitarian law.”162 At 
the same time, it may be too audacious to claim that any incident of non-innocent passage by a 
warship potentially starts an armed conflict, and more nuance should be expected in evaluating 
this possibility. Alternatively, it could also be the case that an international armed conflict 
comes into existence only after a coastal State uses force to compel a warship to leave its 
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territorial sea.163 Moreover, in the present situation, based on the status of waters surrounding 
Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian bilateral agreements, Ukraine can question the legitimacy 
of the Russian request that the Ukrainian warships leave the area,164  making it harder to 
consider the actions of the Ukrainian vessels as hostile. The Tribunal further pointed out that 
other Ukrainian naval vessels had previously undertaken a similar journey without incident.165  
Notably, in reviewing this factor, the ITLOS focused primarily on the conduct of the Ukrainian 
vessels, which is much easier to see from a non-military perspective, only mentioning the fact 
of their arrest by the Russian coast guard in passing. This differs from the approach of the South 
China Sea Tribunal, which focused mainly on the interaction between the two parties rather 
than their independent actions and intentions. In the South China Sea case, the PCA highlighted 
that the Philippines’ armed forces engaged in a stand-off with ships from China’s navy, coast 
guard and other government agencies.166  The Tribunal referred to the situation where the 
military and paramilitary forces are “arrayed in opposition to one another” as a “quintessentially 
military situation” that falls within the exception from the compulsory dispute settlement in art. 
298(1)(b).167 
Analysing the incident near the Kerch Strait from the same perspective, it seems possible to 
outline a somewhat similar stand-off between the military vessels on one side and the 
combination of military and other government vessels on the other. Arguing against this view, 
Ukraine pointed out that the forces of the two States were not “arrayed in opposition to one 
another” in this case, as the Ukrainian warships were trying to leave.168 However, this argument 
does not seem very convincing, as there was similarly no report of the Philippines vessels being 
confrontational during the incidents with the Chinese government vessels, with the Philippines 
reportedly aborting planned operations169 and changing the course of the navy vessels to avoid 
the Chinese vessels.170 Moreover, it seems that both sides do not have to attack simultaneously 
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for the forces of two States to be in opposition to one another. If forces of one of the sides attack 
while the other side attempts to defend itself or flee, the situation would still be likely described 
as a military stand-off. Similarly, if through this argument, Ukraine implies that the Ukrainian 
vessels were not seeking confrontation and attempted to disengage, it is not uncommon for an 
armed confrontation to be initiated by only one side. 
With regard to the specific actions taken by the Russian coast guard, Judge Gao argues that the 
use of force against the Ukrainian navy vessels, such as “the ‘hot pursuit’ and ramming, the 
firing of warning and target shorts, the vessel damage and personal casualties suffered from the 
shooting,” should be qualified as military activity.171 It is also true that force can be used both 
in the military and law enforcement context. However, in contrasting the law enforcement and 
the threat of military action in the Guyana v Suriname case, the Tribunal held that force in law 
enforcement can be used if it is “unavoidable, reasonable and necessary.”172  
It seems more likely that the use of force was not unavoidable in the Ukraine v Russia case, at 
least at the point where the Russian coast guard mounted shots on the Ukrainian vessels, as the 
Ukrainian vessels were trying to disengage and leave the territorial sea. The necessity of the 
use of force is also questionable, as it did not seem necessary to use force to prevent the 
Ukrainian vessels from passing through the Kerch Strait, as the strait was physically blocked. 
Similarly, although ramming of the Ukrainian vessels could potentially prevent them from 
going deeper into the territorial sea, the firing of shots at the stage when the Ukrainian vessels 
were leaving was not necessary for this purpose. The firing might have been unnecessary for 
arresting the Ukrainian vessels too, but the information is insufficient to claim that positively.  
With regard to the reasonableness of the use of force, it is suggested that this factor can be 
judged against the current legal rules of conduct. While the threshold would be different in the 
context of the IHL, the law enforcement activities at sea are governed by the LOSC. The 
Convention provides the rule of conduct in relation to warships in the territorial sea in art. 30. 
It states that the coastal State may require a warship to leave the territorial sea if the warship 
violates the laws and regulations of the coastal State and disregards any request for compliance. 
This is also the provision that Russia invoked to justify the arrest of the vessels during the 
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internal proceedings and charges against the Ukrainian servicemen.173 This article, however, 
does not foresee a scenario where a coastal State uses force or arrests the warship, suggesting 
that government vessels have no law enforcement power against a foreign warship. In the 
context of the law enforcement actions against commercial vessels, the ITLOS stated before 
that the normal practice is to use force only as a last resort.174 While Ukrainian vessels could 
be accused of violating internal regulations of Russia (whether these are consistent with 
international law or not), they did eventually comply with the request to leave the territorial sea 
before they were fired upon. Art. 30 of the LOSC suggests that the use of force against the 
Ukrainian vessels was not reasonable for the purpose of a law enforcement operation and might 
have to be judged in the context of a military activity instead. All that said, the validity of this 
test to distinguish between law enforcement and military activities may be questioned, as the 
fact that a State acted in violation of the rules of conduct regarding law enforcement activities 
does not necessarily mean that those rules are inapplicable. However, it can also be argued that 
failure to observe principles of the law enforcement action against foreign vessels in a space 
governed by international law may seriously heighten tensions between States and 
inadvertently lead to an armed conflict.175 
Apart from that, there is an argument to be made that some activities are military by nature and 
cannot be viewed from the law enforcement perspective altogether, as, for example, the use of 
force against foreign warships.176 Moreover, although there can be no exhaustive list of military 
activities, Judge Jesus points out that some of the activities in art. 19 of the LOSC are strictly 
military, such as, in particular, any threat or use of force against the State sovereignty.177 As 
pointed out before, a warship is equated to the expression of State sovereignty. Hence, the firing 
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of target shots against a naval vessel can amount to the use of force against the State 
sovereignty.178  
Overall, the conduct of the Russian coast guard and the stand-off between the Russian and 
Ukrainian forces seems to be more in line with military activities than law enforcement.  
 
4.4 Cause and purpose 
Having evaluated the actions of the vessels, the ITLOS moved on to assessing what caused the 
Russia-Ukraine incident. The ITLOS identified the cause of the incident as “the Russian 
Federation’s denial of the passage of the Ukrainian naval vessels through the Kerch Strait and 
the attempt by those vessels to proceed nonetheless.”179  The Tribunal discerned from the 
Russian Memorandum that the passage was denied due to the alleged violation of Russian 
internal regulations and the temporary suspension of the right of innocent passage due to 
“security concerns following a recent storm”.180 The Tribunal further stated that in its view, 
differing interpretations regarding the passage regime through the Kerch Strait are not military 
in nature.181 
In its Memorandum, the Russian Federation stated that the incident was provoked by a “non-
permitted secret incursion” of the Ukrainian naval vessels, which the Russian coast guard 
resisted.182 The ITLOS noted that this assertion seems unlikely,183 given the breadth of the 
navigable channels in the Kerch Strait and the fact that the Ukrainian vessels had communicated 
their intentions to the Russian authorities in advance.184 In his separate opinion, Judge Jesus 
supported the view that the Russian claim is unlikely but also mentioned that a “secret 
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incursion” is not one of the activities that violate innocent passage mentioned in art. 19 of the 
LOSC.185 
Russia further claimed that the actions of the Russian coast guard were caused by the fact that 
the Ukrainian vessels were put in a combat position in that the “artillery units were uncovered, 
and guns were elevated at 45 degrees and pointed at Russian Coast Guard vessels.”186 The 
ITLOS did not address this claim. However, Ukraine argued that there is no indication that the 
Ukrainian vessels had any but peaceful intentions. During the oral statements, a counsel of 
Ukraine clarified that sailing with uncovered guns is consistent with both Ukrainian and 
Russian standard operating procedures.187 Furthermore, Ukraine pointed out that given the 
proximity of the Russian coast guard, the 45 degrees elevation of guns would normally be 
interpreted as “signalling the absence of aggressive intent,” as fired at this elevation in this 
situation, “the shells would have travelled far above and beyond the Russian vessels.”188 
Other statements of Russia regarding the suspension of the right of innocent passage in the 
area,189 the failure of the Ukrainian naval vessels to follow the Russian internal regulations,190 
and the demands of the Russian coast guard that the Ukrainian vessels leave the territorial sea 
immediately191 seem to be in line with the conclusion of the ITLOS that the incident occurred 
due to the different interpretation of the passage regimes based on the 2003 bilateral treaty but 
also, possibly, differences regarding the land sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula.  
Apart from the cause, it may also be worth a while to look into the purpose or intent of the 
incident, which Judge Gao identified as a relevant factor in the evaluation of military 
activities.192 On the one hand, the purpose of the incident can be extrapolated from its cause: 
while the cause is differing interpretations of the passage regimes by Ukraine and Russia, the 
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purpose of the incident was to make use of the States’ own rights and act in accordance with 
their own view regarding the legal regime of passage. On the other hand, the passage of the 
Ukrainian vessels may also adopt military features when looked at through the context of the 
underlying land dispute, as an attempted passage by a warship through a disputed territory may 
carry strong military and political implications.193 Although the ITLOS rejected the claim that 
the Ukrainian vessels attempted a “secret incursion,” the presence of naval forces in a disputed 
area can achieve a military objective regardless of whether it is secret or not.194 Judge Kolodkin 
further noted that the “Checklist for Readiness to Sail” found on board of the seized Nikopol 
gunboat stated the Ukrainian warships were to “concentrate on covertly approaching and 
passing through the Kerch Strait” and “stand by to take on missions to stabilize the situation in 
the Azov theatre of operation” upon arrival to the Ukrainian port.195 
Apart from that, given that the Russian coast guard did not allow the Ukrainian vessels to leave 
the territorial sea, the purpose of the use of force could be the arrest (or capture) of the vessels 
and the crew. Depending on the context, this purpose may adopt military elements, as the 
capture of enemy vessels is a recognised military objective permitted in the context of an armed 
conflict.196 Furthermore, given that the Ukrainian vessels were conducting the planned rotation 
to the Azov Sea – the area where Russia significantly increased its control since 2014 – and the 
Russian coast guard prevented them from doing so, the incident begins to resemble more closely 
the confrontation in the South China Sea case, which was recognised as a military activity for 
the purposes of art. 298(1)(b) of the LOSC. Although in the South China Sea case, the Tribunal 
focused primarily on the type of vessels and their conduct, the incident was caused by the 
territorial claims over the Second Thomas Shoal, and its intent was to prevent the resupply and 
rotation of the Philippines’ armed forces.197 
Additionally, Ukraine argued in the Ukraine v Russia case that the Russian suspension of the 
right of innocent passage was not communicated in the usual way.198  Also, since Russia 
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suspended the innocent passage due to a recent storm and a high number of vessels in the area, 
including those with dangerous cargo,199 it may be questioned why the right of passage was 
suspended exclusively for military ships. This argument is reinforced by the fact that art. 25(3) 
of the LOSC allows coastal States to temporarily suspend passage in the areas of their territorial 
sea for protection of its security, “without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign 
ships.” The article further requires that such suspension shall be duly published in order to take 
effect. This may potentially indicate that the Russian intent was not so much to enforce its laws 
and assert its view regarding the regime of passage in the Kerch Strait, but to specifically target 
the Ukrainian navy vessels by preventing them from concluding their rotation and/or capturing 
them.  
Overall, it seems that the general cause of the incident is largely in line with law enforcement 
activities. At the same time, there are indications that the purpose of the incident could have 
both military and law enforcement elements depending on the underlying context.  
 
4.5 Context 
The ITLOS chose the context in which the incident took place as the last relevant circumstance 
for identifying the nature of the events that unfolded near the Kerch Strait.  
The Tribunal pointed out that the force against the Ukrainian naval vessels was used in the 
context of an arrest in an attempt to stop the fleeing vessels.200 The Tribunal stressed that the 
Russian coast guard used force exactly in the moment and context of the Ukrainian vessels 
ignoring the order to stop and continuing their navigation.201 The ITLOS concluded that this 
sequence of events seems to be in the context of a law enforcement operation rather than a 
military one.202 
At the same time, it may seem that the Tribunal chose a very narrow context to set the stage for 
the events that unfolded – it could almost be mixed up with other relevant circumstances, such 
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as the conduct or intent. It may be more valuable for identifying the nature of the activities if 
the context was wide enough to be able to help explain the conduct, cause and purpose of an 
activity, rather than reiterating them.  
In its Memorandum, the Russian Federation put the events near the Kerch Strait in the context 
of “provocative actions and military build-up on the part of Ukraine,” including alleged 
attempts to infiltrate the territory of Crimea and repeated threats to use force against Russian 
vessels. 203  Russia has also actively cited Ukraine’s remarks made outside of the ITLOS 
proceedings to support the claim that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction based on the military 
activities exception. For example, Russia cited Ukraine’s statements made before the UN 
Security Council on 26 November 2018, where Ukraine referred to Russia’s actions as an “act 
of aggression” and “belligerent acts.”204 In a note verbale to Russia, Ukraine referred to “a 
flagrant violation of article 33 of the UN Charter” regarding pacific settlement of disputes and 
stated that it “reserves the right to apply article 51 of the UN Charter concerning the right to 
self-defence.”205 In Ukraine’s request for interim measures to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Ukraine claimed that the Ukrainian sailors should be treated as prisoners of war, 
highlighting the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention.206 
At the same time, Judge Kittichaisaree pointed out that Ukraine is not estopped from resorting 
to the law of the sea in these proceedings based on these previous statements.207 To fulfil one 
of the main elements of estoppel, Russia must prove that it was induced to act to its detriment 
due to Ukraine’s position.208 However, both Ukraine and Russia based their positions on the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC in the submissions made to the ITLOS.209 
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In analysing Russia’s claims during the ITLOS proceedings, Judge Kittichaisaree further noted 
that Russia mainly refers to Ukraine’s arguments when talking about the presence of an armed 
conflict between the two States and does not seem to actually accept these arguments.210 On the 
contrary, Russia repeatedly denied that its actions were military in nature and charged the 
captive Ukrainian sailors with violations of criminal law.211 According to the Judge, since 
Russia does not openly admit the existence of an armed conflict, only mentioning it in the 
context of Ukraine’s previous remarks, the law of naval warfare should not be applicable during 
the proceedings.212  
This discussion goes back to the argument about whether the position of States should be taken 
into account when evaluating the nature of certain activities as military or law enforcement. It 
seems that the ITLOS opted in favour of the objective evaluation, especially because the 
positions of Ukraine and Russia in this matter often lack consistency, and it does not seem 
possible to resort to estoppel. Furthermore, it is expected of States to argue in support of their 
own interests during the judicial proceedings. Finally, the sensitivity of the subject may make 
it more likely that the statements of States will lack accuracy.  
The objective approach in the evaluation of military activities (or, in this case, the presence of 
an armed conflict) also seems to be favoured by the IHL. It may prove to be beneficial to apply 
similar approaches in both the IHL and the law of the sea regimes, as it could help prevent 
overlap of the regimes and potential legal gaps. Art. 2, common for all four Geneva 
Conventions, sets conditions for the application of the IHL. The provision focuses on the de 
facto existence of hostilities, whether recognised by States or not, especially when classic 
means and methods of warfare come into play, “such as the deployment of troops on the 
enemy’s territory, the use of artillery or the resort to jetfighters or combat helicopters.”213 The 
evaluation of the situation developed in the Geneva Conventions is always objective and does 
not rely on the characterisation of the situation by governments unless the war has actually been 
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declared.214 Moreover, for the application of art. 2(1) any use of force suffices, with no special 
requirement regarding a level of intensity or duration,215 as “[e]ven minor skirmishes between 
the armed forces, be they land, air or naval forces, would spark an international armed conflict 
and lead to the applicability of humanitarian law.”216  The intentional ramming of foreign 
warships could also arguably be interpreted as “an act of violence by the use of a traditional 
means of warfare” on par with the firing of shots.217 
The occupation of Crimea and the ongoing clashes between Ukrainian government forces and 
pro-Russian armed formations in eastern Ukraine leave little doubt about the presence of an 
armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine and the applicability of the IHL, whether it applies 
to the incident near the Kerch Strait or not. Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions states that the 
Conventions apply to all cases of total or partial occupation of a State’s territory, “even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” The Office of the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) assessed that the situation on the Crimean Peninsula 
amounts to an international armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which started at the 
latest on 26 February 2014 and continues to apply “to the extent that the situation within the 
territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually amounts to an ongoing state of occupation.”218 
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor also analysed the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, concluding 
the existence of a non-international armed conflict there since 30 April 2014.219 Furthermore, 
due to a direct military engagement of the Russian armed forces, the Office suggested the 
existence of an international armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia in eastern Ukraine 
since 14 July 2014 at the latest that goes on in parallel to the non-international one.220 The 
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Office also did not reject the possibility of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine being entirely 
international.221 
Whether the context is viewed as a separate element from the possible application of the 
humanitarian law or together with it, it may be short-sighted to ignore the ongoing armed 
conflict between the two States while analysing a separate incident of the use of force involving 
these States’ government vessels. Although not everything can be interpreted as part of an 
ongoing conflict, it could also be harmful to re-evaluate the meeting of a threshold for every 
incident between the same adversaries when the armed conflict between them, according to its 
legal definition, has already been generally recognised and continues to exist. At the same time, 
while the objective evaluation of the context of the Kerch Strait incident seems to indicate the 
military nature of the incident in question, it is hard to expect from the provisional measures 
Tribunal to recognise the lack of jurisdiction based on the applicability of the IHL when neither 
of the parties directly mentions its applicability during the proceedings.  
 
4.6 The nature of the Kerch Strait incident 
Upon analysing the conduct, cause and context of the incident near the Kerch Strait, the 
Tribunal found it possible to conclude that the arrest and detention of the Ukrainian vessels 
took place as part of a law enforcement operation.222 
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the evaluation of the Tribunal was made 
only prima facie. The ITLOS had to decide whether there is a possibility or plausibility that the 
activities could not be military in nature.223 The conclusions of the Tribunal seem to indicate 
that the incident demonstrated law enforcement elements; however, the present analysis 
suggests that they are intertwined with the military ones. Given that it is possible for both 
military and law enforcement activities to exist simultaneously, it is likely that the PCA would 
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need to apply a preponderance test during the proceedings on the merits of the case to decide 
whether the law enforcement or military element is predominant.224  
The considerations laid out in the thesis suggest the overall dominance of the military elements 
in the present case study. The types of vessels involved in the incident are generally appropriate 
during both law enforcement and military operations; however, the use of force against a 
military vessel that represents the sovereignty of the flag State tips the scale towards the military 
activities. The analysis of the conduct of the vessels in line with the PCA’s assessment of the 
stand-off in the South China Sea case heavily suggests that the incident falls under the military 
exception in art. 298(1)(b).  
The cause of the incident in the Ukraine v Russia case seems to be more akin to the law 
enforcement nature. Still, with regard to the purpose, it seems possible to extrapolate the 
presence of intentions of military nature, especially when reviewed together with the context. 
It is difficult to evaluate how broad of a context should be taken into account for assessing the 
nature of the activities, and it can be argued that the context used in the thesis is too broad. 
However, in the author’s view, a wider application of the context that includes the discussion 
on the ongoing armed conflict between the two States helps separate this factor from the 
conduct and cause of the incident and provide a background that may be necessary for better 
understanding of the cause and purpose of the incident.  
Given the low threshold of art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions and the ongoing state of an armed 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is also possible to suggest that the IHL can be applicable 
to the present incident. As Judge Lijnzaad pointed out, the questions of whether the case solely 
relates to the interpretation and application of the LOSC or also involves the interpretation and 
application of the laws of armed conflict lie well beyond the prima facie analysis of the request 
for provisional measures and may be addressed at a later stage by the PCA.225 However, in the 
view of the author, the evaluation of the incident strictly from the perspective of the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC still suggests that the military element overpowers 
the law enforcement one.  
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All these considerations, combined with a generally broader interpretation of the word 
“concerning” suggested in the thesis, lead to a conclusion that the 2018 incident near the Kerch 
Strait can be predominantly characterised as a military activity that can be excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement by virtue of art. 298(1)(b).   
At the same time, only those issues within the dispute that are military in nature or inseparably 
connected to the military issues can preclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Russia argued 
during the proceedings that the military exception covers not only the use of force and arrest of 
the Ukrainian vessels but all issues within the present dispute because the “[d]etention… 
resulted directly from the incident of 25 November 2018 and thus cannot be considered 
separately from the respective chain of events, involving military personnel and equipment both 
from the Russian and Ukrainian sides.”226 Similar to the argument the PCA made regarding the 
difference between the sea boundary delimitation disputes and the disputes regarding the 
presence of entitlement or status of land features, it is not enough that an issue has some 
connection to the issues excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement, to be automatically 
excluded together with it. Such issues as the status of waters (without the determination of the 
status of Crimea), the passage regime and innocent passage of warships within the Ukraine v 
Russia case do not require that the Tribunal decides on the legality of Russia’s use of force in, 
possibly, a military context, and therefore, should not strip the Tribunal from its jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the prolonged detention of the warships and the domestic prosecution of the 
Ukrainian sailors could also possibly be reviewed separately from the use of force against them 
and their capture.227 
Finally, if the PCA finds that the incident near the Kerch Strait indeed qualifies as a military 
activity, a question could be raised of whether the optional exceptions from the compulsory 
dispute settlement sufficiently protect States from compulsory dispute settlement during the 
proceedings on provisional measures, considering a much lower threshold for jurisdiction. 
However, considering that per art. 290(1 and 5) of the LOSC, provisional measures only refer 
to urgent measures appropriate “to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or 
to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,” the proceedings on provisional measures 
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can also be viewed as a certain safety valve that must still uphold the optional exceptions while 
avoiding decisions on the merits, but can also protect the essential interests of the claimant.   
 
Chapter V. Conclusion 
The 2018 incident between Russia and Ukraine near the Kerch Strait unfolded against the 
backdrop of the growing tensions between the two States relating to the land sovereignty 
dispute over the Crimean Peninsula and the maritime zones surrounding it, the unresolved 
disagreements regarding the status of waters in the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait, differences 
regarding the interpretation and application of the 2003 bilateral treaty, and the ongoing clashes 
between Ukrainian government forces and the pro-Russian armed formations in eastern 
Ukraine. The incident found its way to the ITLOS, which confirmed prima facie jurisdiction 
over the case and issued an order on the prescription of provisional measures. The case currently 
awaits the PCA’s final decision on jurisdiction and merits of the dispute.  
The carefully developed LOSC compulsory dispute settlement system creates great 
opportunities for States to resolve contentious issues in the law of the sea domain. At the same 
time, it was built to strike a compromise between the essential interests States wish to protect 
from the international adjudication and the interest of the international community in the 
effective dispute resolution and progressive development of the international law. This 
compromise becomes especially apparent and must be upheld in disputes involving the optional 
exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement, as a too broad interpretation of the 
exceptions may hinder the effectiveness and reliability of the LOSC dispute resolution system, 
while a very narrow interpretation may provoke fears that the tribunals do not give due regard 
to the sensitive issues protected by the Convention and undermine the trust in the international 
judicial institutions.  
Due to the Ukraine v Russia case regarding the arrest of the Ukrainian naval vessels and crew 
near the Kerch Strait, the military exception managed to receive more attention in the 
jurisprudence than it has had so far, with the South China Sea case and the award on the 
preliminary objections in the Ukraine v Russia case regarding the coastal State rights only 
briefly evaluating the art. 298(1)(b) exception. The final PCA award in the case regarding the 
Kerch Strait incident has the potential of further clarifying the applicability of the military 
exception and settling some of the issues raised in the ITLOS order on provisional measures. 
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The heightened attention to the present topic may benefit the development of international law 
in the area of security operations at sea and lead to a better understanding of the law applicable 
to various quasi-military situations worldwide.   
The analysis in the thesis suggests that international courts and tribunals generally opt for a 
more narrow interpretation of the provisions that may strip them of jurisdiction, sometimes, 
possibly, to the detriment of the effectiveness of the optional exceptions from the compulsory 
dispute settlement. This tendency is followed by the ITLOS order on provisional measures in 
the Ukraine v Russia case, which seems to adopt a very different approach in evaluating the 
applicability of the military exception than the one used in the South China Sea case. This could 
be attributed to the fact that the ITLOS was only required to establish jurisdiction prima facie, 
which assumes a much lower threshold for jurisdiction. This, in turn, could raise questions 
about the effectiveness of the optional exceptions of art. 298 in protecting the sensitive interests 
of States during the proceedings regarding provisional measures and whether the lower 
threshold for jurisdiction is sufficiently justified by the need to urgently protect the rights of the 
claimant. 
The thesis also highlights possible inconsistencies in the interpretation of the word 
“concerning” when it comes to the exceptions from the compulsory dispute settlement and other 
unrelated issues.  The analysis of non-English authentic texts may suggest that the drafters 
intended for “disputes concerning military activities” to have a broader interpretation that 
includes military activities as such, together with inseparable issues and issues bearing a strong, 
impactful relationship with the military activities.  
The case law further suggests that the following criteria are most relevant for distinguishing 
between law enforcement and military activities for the purposes of art. 298(1)(b): the type of 
vessels, the conduct, the cause, the purpose, and the context. Even so, the military and law 
enforcement activities are not mutually exclusive, so there might be a need to evaluate a 
predominant element in each of these criteria in order to conclude whether the military activities 
exception applies to a dispute. 
Additionally, the author supports the conclusion of the ITLOS that the nature of the activities 
should be assessed based on an objective evaluation of the abovementioned criteria. Although 
the positions of States regarding their own actions may be taken into account for this purpose, 
they should not be a decisive factor unless estoppel can be invoked. The objective evaluation 
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is preferable considering the sensitivity of the security issues to States and the fact that States 
normally choose arguments that support their own position in a given case. The objective 
approach is also favoured by the IHL conventions, and it might prove advantageous to keep 
approaches regarding the evaluation of comparable issues similar across different legal 
instruments to avoid further fragmentation of the international law.   
Regarding the type of vessel, this criterion loses some relevancy when it comes to 
distinguishing between warships and other government vessels due to the blurring of the line 
between the two. However, it becomes more relevant when comparing warships to commercial 
vessels. In the Ukraine v Russia case, the types of vessels involved in the incident are 
appropriate for both law enforcement and military operations. However, analysing the types of 
vessels in conjunction with their conduct, which involves the use of force against a warship, 
and the argument that governments have no law enforcement powers over foreign warships 
reveals higher relevancy to the types of vessels involved in the incident between Russian and 
Ukraine and signifies the military nature of activities that took place during the incident. 
With regard to the conduct of vessels, the author supports the South China Sea case approach 
of analysing the interaction between the two sides for evaluating the nature of the activities, 
rather than focusing on individual actions of the parties to a dispute. This approach leads to the 
conclusion that the conduct in the Ukraine v Russia case, which included a stand-off between 
the Russian and Ukrainian forces and the clear use of force against foreign naval vessels, 
amounts to military activity. Even if we assumed that the Russian coast guard was involved in 
a law enforcement operation, we would also have to accept that the Russian forces acted in 
violation of principles of unavoidableness, necessity, and reasonableness of law enforcement 
action, which potentially may be interpreted as crossing the line into the realm of military 
activities.  
The author agrees with the findings of the ITLOS regarding the cause of the incident, which 
was interpreted as differing interpretations of the passage regime in the Kerch Strait. The author 
further agrees with the Tribunal that this cause seems to have more of a law enforcement nature, 
although convincing arguments have been made regarding the possibility of evaluating the 
passage of warships as a military activity. 
It is further suggested that the purpose or intent of the incident should not be overlooked when 
assessing the nature of the Kerch Strait incident, even though this factor can be hard to evaluate 
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objectively. In the Ukraine v Russia case, the purpose seems to involve both law enforcement 
and military features, however taking into account the incident’s context, the military element 
in the intentions of both parties appears to become more prominent.  
The author further suggests that the context of the incident in the Ukraine v Russia dispute 
should be broad enough to help objectively evaluate the purpose of the incident and set the 
stage for a better understanding of the nature of the activities. Given the recognised ongoing 
armed conflict between the two States, the context seems to suggest a military nature of 
activities that unfolded near the Kerch Strait in 2018. The context of the incident also raises the 
question of the applicability of the IHL to the present case, which could restrict the PCA’s 
jurisdiction also based on art. 288 of the LOSC. Although, it remains to be seen whether the 
PCA will take into consideration the possible application of the IHL, despite the fact that neither 
of the parties has brought it up so far.  
Finally, should the PCA disagree with the findings of the ITLOS and recognise the applicability 
of the military exception to the present case, it is of utmost importance that the lack of 
jurisdiction is limited to issues that indeed concern military activities. A number of issues within 
the present dispute, such as, among others, the passage regime in and around the Kerch Strait 
and the innocent passage of warships, should not be automatically excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement based on the co-existence of a dispute concerning military 
activities, as both the international dispute resolution system and the peace and security at sea 
could be compromised if States had an opportunity to avoid their international responsibility 










Figure 1 – General map 
 
Figure 2 – Azov Sea as internal waters with a hypothetical median line 
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Figure 3 – Hypothetical delimitation of the Azov Sea with normal maritime zones 
 
Figure 4 – Planned journey228 
 
228 Image source: http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/30/russian-attack-on-ukrainian-ships-who-has-
a-right-to-do-what-in-the-azov-sea/ [image edited] [last accessed 5 June 2021].  
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